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Abstract
The European Union (EU) is premised upon a project of inclusion: in this regard, it commits itself and
its Member States to the acceptance and tolerance of all members of the Union and their citizens and
residents. The UK’s Brexit saga eclipsed these ambitions, and highlighted an increasingly vivid
anti-immigrant atmosphere. Brexit brought to the fore not only acts of discrimination against EU citizens
and others seen to be outsiders in the UK, but also emphasised the existence of strong underlying sentiments
of discrimination against them. The intensification of such sentiments surrounded the eventual 2016
referendum vote in favour of leaving the EU, and this arguably demonstrates the significance of (failing
in) addressing such sentiments. This in turn raises questions relating to the suitability of the EU’s choice
of tools for addressing discrimination. There has been a mismatch between the tools adopted and the
types of discrimination prevalent in the UK. EU legal tools of anti-discrimination and equality focus
primarily on tackling visible individual “acts” of discrimination, leaving almost untouched concerns of
underlying “sentiments” of discrimination. This is a result not only of weaknesses in the legal tools
themselves, but on an over-reliance on them, arguably to the neglect of embracing non-legal initiatives
as a means of addressing underlying societal sentiments. While the example of the UK and Brexit is used
in this article, discrimination of this nature is a Europe-wide concern.
Introduction
The European Union (EU)1 is premised upon a project of inclusion: in this regard, it commits itself and
its Member States to the acceptance and tolerance of all members of the Union and their citizens and
residents. The UK’s Brexit saga eclipsed these ambitions, and highlighted an increasingly vivid
anti-immigrant atmosphere. Brexit brought to the fore not only acts of discrimination against EU citizens
and others seen to be outsiders in the UK,2 but also emphasised the existence of strong underlying sentiments
of discrimination3 against them. Intensification of such sentiments surrounded the eventual 2016 referendum
*Reader and Associate Dean (Research), City Law School, City, University of London. My thanks go to the Editors
and the anonymous reviewer, as well as my colleagues Dr MazenMasri and Alex Powell (Doctoral student, City Law
School) for their insights on an earlier draft of this article, and also to Nicol Ahadyova (LLB Graduate, City Law
School) for her excellent research assistance.
1The term “EU” will be used throughout this article, including to refer to the old European Economic Community
(EEC) and European Community (EC).
2Various descriptors around who belongs to a society do not have static meaning, but are demarcated contextually,
and sometimes even implicitly, to give effect to contemporary sentiments. See discussion in J. Butler, Notes Toward
a Performative Theory of Assembly (Cambridge, MA/London: Harvard University Press, 2018), pp.24–65.
3This notion of underlying sentiments of discrimination can be seen as related to terms such as racism, prejudice,
or xenophobia, or thoughts, feelings or sentiments of rejection of others. See further: J. Butler, Frames of War: When
is Life Grievable? (London/New York: Verso Books, 2009), esp. pp.1–53.
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vote in favour of leaving the EU, and this arguably demonstrates the significance of (failing in) addressing
such sentiments.
This in turn raises questions relating to the EU’s choice of tools for addressing discrimination: there
has been a mismatch between the tool adopted and the types of discrimination prevalent in the UK. EU
legal tools of anti-discrimination and equality focus primarily on tackling visible individual acts of
discrimination and devote less attention to underlying sentiments of discrimination. This is a result not
only of weaknesses in the legal tools themselves, but on an over-reliance on them, arguably to the neglect
of embracing non-legal initiatives as a means of addressing underlying societal sentiments.4 Maeso has
argued that “legal responses to racism in the European context show that law has been a latecomer in the
combat to racial discrimination and its intervention has been rather poor”.5 While she draws attention
mainly to the need for case law to engage with “wider political and policy developments that have shaped
the silence about race and racism in Europe”,6 this article also assesses the limitations of other aspects of
EU law, such as its overall function as a remedial tool as opposed to a preventative one; its focus on
individual acts of discrimination and remedies to tackle such individual acts; as well as the failure of EU
law thus far to flourish into a model for positive action. Most significantly, the article highlights the
limitations of law as a tool for addressing sentiments of discrimination.
The article proceeds in the following manner. First, it introduces the UK’s membership of the EU and
the vivid anti-immigrant focus surrounding Brexit. It argues that the anti-immigrant sentiments and actions
surrounding Brexit encompassed both individual acts of discrimination, and underlying societal sentiments
of discrimination towards others. Secondly, it digs deeper into the notion of sentiments of discrimination.
Thirdly, it critiques the contributions of EU law to addressing this type of discrimination in society. It
argues that EU law’s weakness is that it focuses primarily on addressing individual acts of discrimination.
Fourthly, it examines what “effectiveness” in addressing underlying sentiments of discrimination might
entail, and makes the case that non-legal approaches could usefully go some way towards addressing the
limitations of the legal tools currently relied upon.
The UK in the EU, Brexit and the rejection of others
This section outlines the UK’s relationship with the EU. First, it demonstrates that UK politics and public
sentiments on EUmembership concerned parliamentary sovereignty and the economy. Secondly, it argues
that by the 1990s and in the lead-up to Brexit, the concerns had shifted to national identity in the substantive
ethnic sense of what it is to be “British” (ethno-nationalist considerations). This part focuses on recent
attitudes towards migrants and demonstrating that the topic of immigration pervaded Brexit and its lead-up.7
It further argues that anti-immigration sentiments in the Brexit context were of a dual nature: consisting
of individual acts of discrimination, and also a general underlying sentiment of discrimination.
1970s and 1980s
Perhaps reflecting its physical separation as an “island” cut off from mainland Europe, the UK has always
been seen as a reluctant EUMember State. The UKwas not a founding member of the EU and was rejected
twice by Charles de Gaulle (1963 and 1967) for EU membership, but opposition to the UK’s EU
4Sayce has highlighted the need for an integrated approach to tackling the power dynamics which support
discriminatory sentiments. See: L. Sayce, “Beyond Good Intentions: Making Anti-Discrimination Strategies Work”
(2003) 18 Disability and Society 625, 625–630.
5S. Rodríguez Maeso, “‘Europe’ and the Narrative of the ‘True Racist’: (Un-)Thinking Anti-Discrimination Law
Through Race” (2018) 8 Onati Socio-Legal Series 845, 848.
6Rodríguez Maeso, “‘Europe’ and the Narrative of the ‘True Racist’” (2018) 8 Onati Socio-Legal Series 845, 845.
7Rodríguez Maeso, “‘Europe’ and the Narrative of the ‘True Racist’” (2018) 8 Onati Socio-Legal Series 845, 852.
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membership did not come only from external sources. It was also evident internally in the UK and thus
almost as soon as the UK was accepted as a Member State in 1973, an avenue for its swift exit was
presented in 1975, in the form of a referendum on continued EU membership. 6 per cent of the British
public voted to remain in the EU. However, polls during that time and since then have recorded continuous
oscillation of support for the UK’s EU membership.8
In the 1970s and 1980s, a significant factor motivating the periods of declining support for EU
membership was civic in nature9: that is that they related to the UK’s social institutions—here, parliamentary
sovereignty.10 Now, this did relate to National identity.11 However, this was only in so far as it concerned
the powers of Parliament to remain the ultimate decision-making institution for the UK.12 The decision of
the UK’s membership in the EU did not revolve around anti-immigration sentiments,13 or to put it another
way, the decisions politicians and the public sought from a sovereign parliament were not ethno-national
in nature: something we see instead in the next phase of the 1990s onwards
1990s onwards
Despite the 1975 vote to remain, over the next four decades, and particularly from the mid-1990s, an
ethno-nationalist dimension to the debate on the UK’s EUmembership arose. Opposition to EUmembership
remained, grew, and became more institutionalised and organised: James Goldsmith’s Eurosceptic
“ReferendumMovement”14 in the 1990s eventually inspired a political party devoted to the UK’s removal
from the EU—the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP).15 Opposition to EU membership also
became intertwined with the politics of a range of domestic concerns for the British public, on which
rested views concerning who was entitled to access Britain and its resources.
865% in favour of leaving the EU in 1979 when Margaret Thatcher came to power; going down to 40% during the
time of John Major’s negotiation of the Maastricht Treaty, and thereafter being in favour of remain until 1999. See
R.Mortimore, “Polling History: 40 Years of British Views on ‘in or out’ of Europe” (21 June 2016) The Conversation,
https://theconversation.com/polling-history-40-years-of-british-views-on-in-or-out-of-europe-61250. See also: Ipsos
Mori, “European Union Membership Trends” (2016), https://www.ipsos.com/ipsos-mori/en-uk/european-union
-membership-trends [Both accessed 8 July 2019].
9 J. Wakefield, N. Hopkins et al., “The Impact of Adopting Ethnic or Civic Conceptions of National Belonging for
Others’ Treatment” (2011) 37 Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 1599, 1600.
10A. Mullen, “Spinning Europe: Pro-European Union Propaganda Campaigns in Britain, 1962-1975” (2005) 76
Political Quarterly 100, 107. See also R. Shephard, “Leadership, Public Opinion and the Referendum” (1975) 46
Political Quarterly 25, 28.
11There was also opposition to EU economic policy, rooted in the Labour Party. Having said that, it was Labour
that instigated a referendum and Labour that renegotiated a Common Market Package and then backed a “yes”
campaign. See A. Williamson, “The Case for Brexit, Lessons from the 1960s and 1970s” (5 May 2015), History and
Policy, http://www.historyandpolicy.org/policy-papers/papers/the-case-for-brexit-lessons-from-1960s-and-1970s
[Accessed 8 July 2019]. These concerns were reflected in the terms of the 1975 re-negotiation of the UK’s membership
of the EU, all of which were economic. See V. Miller, “The 1974–75 UK Renegotiation of EEC Membership and
Referendum”, Briefing Paper No.7253 (House of Commons Library, 2015), p.6.
12P.M. Gliddon, “The Labour Government and the Battle for Public Opinion in the 1975 Referendum on the
European Community” (2017) 31Contemporary British History 91, 97; A.Mullen and B. Burkett, “Spinning Europe:
Pro-European Union Propaganda Campaigns in Britain, 1962–1975” (2005) 76 Political Quarterly 100, 107.
13 In the 1960s and 1970s, there were concerns about “black” or “brown” immigration. Thus, immigration per se
was an issue, but immigration from “white” Western European countries was not.
14N. Carter, M. Evans, K. Alderman and S. Gorham, “Europe, Goldsmith and the Referendum Party” (1998) 51
Parliamentary Affairs 470. See also S. O’Grady, “How Britain came to the brink of leaving the European Union” (16
June 2016), The Independent, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/how-britain-came-to-the-brink-of
-leaving-the-european-union-a7085486.html [Accessed 8 July 2019].
15R. Ford andM. Goodwin, “Understanding UKIP: Identity, Social Change and the Left Behind” (2014) 85 Political
Quarterly 277; J. Dennison, “Immigration, Issue Ownership and the Rise of UKIP” (2015) 68 Parliamentary Affairs
168.
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Although issues of parliamentary sovereignty and economic prudency were central aspects of the
debates, Henderson et al., in reviewing contemporary public surveys, identified in particular, “those with
a strongly or exclusively English sense of their own national identity were the most (overwhelmingly)
hostile” towards the EU.16 This became linked to immigration, and not just (as was the case in the 1975
referendum) to civic national identity in the sense of parliamentary sovereignty only. In fact, by 2014 and
2015, immigration was either the number one biggest worry for the British public or among the top of the
list.17 The importance of the issue in the eyes of the British public was coupled with an increasingly angry
population, manifesting increased public hostility towards “foreigners”. Political groups like UKIP drew
on this to bring to the fore concerns about the number of EU migrants in the UK. The culmination of all
of this—as we know—was that in the 2015 UK general elections, the Conservative Party manifesto
promised a referendum on the EU, based on a negotiated EU membership package, which would then be
put before the public in a vote. The vote, which took place on 23 June 2016, and returned a 52 per cent
result in favour of leaving the EU, narrowly beating the 48 per cent of the public voting to remain in the
EU. The period leading up to the vote (and thereafter) quickly turned into a toxic anti-immigration
environment—with the immigration agenda frequently dominating the Brexit debate. The Brexit context
became, in other words, a platform for espousing ethno-nationalist sentiments. While the Brexit debate
did not at all times rest on this clear distinction, the argument here is that there could be discerned British
public views which distinguished between those who belonged to Britain and those who did not, based
on ethno-national considerations.18
We saw this in its most visible form as a range of discriminatory acts in the UK directed towards
immigrants or those perceived to be immigrants. In fact, police figures show that in the 98 days before
and after Brexit, there was a 31.6 per cent increase in racist and religious hate crimes.19Race hate incidents
surged by 23 per cent — from 40,749 to 49,921 — in the 11 months after the EU referendum20 and hate
crimes almost doubled in schools during the Brexit campaign period.21 Acts across the UK ranged from
graffiti, offensive leaflets,22 to verbal and physical incidents of Islamophobia.23
16A. Henderson, C. Jeffrey, R. Lineira, R. Scully, D.Wincott, and R.Wyn Jones, “England, Englishness and Brexit”
(2016) 87 The Political Quarterly 187.
17 Ipsos Mori, “Economist/ Ipsos MORI January 2016 Issues index” (2016), https://www.ipsos.com/ipsos-mori/en
-uk/economist-ipsos-mori-january-2016-issues-index [Accessed 8 July 2019].
18This might be seen as playing out findings of social psychology studies which “show that the more individuals
endorse ethnic over civic criteria, the more they adopt anti-immigrant attitudes”. See Wakefield, Hopkins et al., “The
Impact of Adopting Ethnic or civic Conceptions of National Belonging for Others’ Treatment” (2011) 37 Personality
and Social Psychology 1599, 1600. See also S. Shulman, “Challenging the Civic/Ethnic and West/East Dichotomies
in the Study of Nationalism” (2002) 35 Comparative Political Studies 554, 554–557.
19Metropolitan Police, “Hate Offences Before and After Brexit” (2016), Metropolitan Police, https://www.met
.police.uk/SysSiteAssets/foi-media/metropolitan-police/disclosure_2016/november_2016/information-rights-unit--
-statistics-in-regards-to-the-number-of-hate-crimes-committed-from-before-and-after-the-brexit-vote [Accessed 8
July 2019].
20M. Bulman, “Brexit vote sees highest spike in religious and racial hate crimes ever recorded” (7 July 2017), The
Independent, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/racist-hate-crimes-surge-to-record-high-after-brexit
-vote-new-figures-reveal-a7829551.html [Accessed 8 July 2019].
21M. Bulman, “Hate crimes almost doubled in schools during Brexit campaign period, figures reveal” (6 May
2017), The Independent, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/hate-incidents-crimes-schools-89-brexit
-campaign-figures-students-pupils-xenophobia-racism-a7720551.html [Accessed 8 July 2019].
22N. Hellen and S. Griffith, “Racist flyers left near school tell Poles: Go home” (26 June 2016), The Times, https:
//www.thetimes.co.uk/article/racist-flyers-left-near-school-tell-poles-go-home-hvffr7jd3; J. Micklethwaite, “Police
probe racist graffiti smeared on Polish centre after Brexit vote” (26 June 2016), London Evening Standard, https:/
/www.standard.co.uk/news/london/police-probe-racist-graffiti-smeared-on-polish-centre-after-brexit-vote-a3281081
.html [Both accessed 8 July 2019].
23Although also towards black people and Jewish people, and those speaking a foreign language. Children were
also targeted. See J. Burnett, “Racial Violence and the Brexit State” (2016), p.6, Institute of Race Relations, http:/
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These outwards acts are an indication of discriminatory sentiments in Brexit Britain. However, these
sentiments go beyond discriminatory acts. A general underlying environment of rejection of others, rather
than an acceptance of others, was prevalent within British society. Thus, tackling overt acts of discrimination
only partly addresses the obstacles to the fulfilment of the EU’s project of inclusion.
Underlying sentiments of discrimination
The analysis above noted that acts of discrimination ensued across the Brexit context. This section outlines
that discrimination went beyond “acts” and pervaded societal attitudes. This is representative of the general
state of exclusion in British society concerning the tolerance of others.
Factions of the leave campaign linked Brexit to immigration—or “others”—in at least two forms: first,
too much immigration was blamed for a whole host of British problems, and secondly, immigration was
raised as a concern in and of itself. In relation to the former, it was argued that immigration into the UK
was uncontrolled and caused strains around various issues, such as access to employment, housing,
education and the NHS.24 Employment represented one of the most prominent complaints from the Brexit
camp. It was claimed that there had been a growth in foreign workers in the UK, including a significant
growth of EU citizens. This was then related negatively to the EU in a twofold manner: that the competition
for jobs from EU nationals was seen to result in the unemployment of UK nationals25 and that a surplus
of workers in the market was producing downward pressures on wages.26Negative media articles emerged
in abundance, including “Millions of EU migrants grab our jobs”27; “migrants DO take our jobs”28; Nigel
Farage (the leader of UKIP at the time) was quoted as saying “Mass EU migration continues, damaging
prospects of ordinary British workers”.29 The Brexiteer campaigner Ian Duncan Smith also argued that
/www.irr.org.uk/app/uploads/2016/11/Racial-violence-and-the-Brexit-state-final.pdf. See also Bulman, “Hate crimes
almost doubled in schools during Brexit campaign period, figures reveal” (6 May 2017), The Independent, https:/
/www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/hate-incidents-crimes-schools-89-brexit-campaign-figures-students
-pupils-xenophobia-racism-a7720551.html [Accessed 8 July 2019]; L. Dearden, “Muslim woman dragged along
pavement by hijab in London hate crime attack” (16 December 2016), The Independent, https://www.independent.co
.uk/news/uk/crime/muslim-hate-crime-london-attack-woman-hijab-headscarf-ripped-off-pushed-injured-chingford
-a7479766.html [All accessed 8 July 2019].
24For a discussion, see S. Gietel-Basten, “Why Brexit? The Toxic Mix of Immigration and Austerity” (2016) 42
Population and Development Review 673.
25M. Wilkinson, “Amber Rudd vows to stop migrants ‘taking jobs British people could do’ and force companies
to reveal number of foreigners they employ” (4 October 2016), Daily Telegraph, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news
/2016/10/04/jeremy-hunt-nhs-doctors-theresa-may-conservative-conference-live. However, see also “Reality Check:
Do EU migrants take jobs from UK-born workers?” (10 May 2016), BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-eu
-referendum-36261966 [Both accessed 8 July 2019].
26 J. Kirkup, “Theresa May’s immigration speech is dangerous and factually wrong” (6 October 2015), Daily
Telegraph, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/immigration/11913927/Theresa-Mays-immigration-speech-is
-dangerous-and-factually-wrong.html [Accessed 8 July 2019].
27M. Hall, “MILLIONS of EU migrants grab our jobs: Time for Brexit to FINALLY take control of borders” (18
February 2016), Daily Express, https://www.express.co.uk/news/politics/645052/2m-EU-migrants-grab-jobs-Brexit
-take-control-of-our-borders [Accessed 8 July 2019].
28A. Dawar, “Migrants DO take our jobs: Britons losing out to foreign workers, says official study” (9 July 2014),
Daily Express, https://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/487645/Migrants-take-British-workers-jobs-says-official-study
[Accessed 8 July 2019].
29Hall, “MILLIONS of EU migrants grab our jobs” (18 February 2016), Daily Express, https://www.express.co.uk
/news/politics/645052/2m-EU-migrants-grab-jobs-Brexit-take-control-of-our-borders [Accessed 8 July 2019].
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“Brits on low pay— and those out of work — are forced to compete with millions of people from abroad
for jobs”.30
In another example, the UK’s housing shortage crisis was also placed on the shoulders of the EU. It
was argued that because the UK accepted EU migration, British citizens were unable to obtain homes and
the cost of homes was increasing. Migration Watch claimed that the UK would need to build one home
every four minutes for the next 25 years just to house future migrants and their children.31 In education,
concerns were raised around shortages of school places and big class sizes, as well as the increasingly
diverse language needs in schools. Migration Watch argued that between 2010 and 2020, 1 million extra
school places would be needed at a cost of almost £100 billion.32 Ministers such as Priti Patel, during the
Brexit campaign, claimed that uncontrolled migration had resulted in parents missing out on their first
choice of school for their children, and that “there is unsustainable pressures on our school system”.33
There were also accusations that millions of pounds was being sent to European countries abroad as
child benefit or tax credit or housing benefit.34 In addition, it was claimed that EU migrants were “health
tourists”, as a result of which our NHS was crumbling.35 The issue of crimes being committed by EU
nationals and the perceived inability of the UK to deport criminals were blamed on EU rules protecting
the free movement of persons. In 2016, theDailyMail reported that criminal notifications for EUmigrants
leaped by 40 per cent in five years: now there were 700 every week in the UK, but fewer than 20,000
foreign criminals had been deported.36
With these debates, the issue of immigration was linked to pressures on the UK’s national systems, and
a claim of unfair allocation of resources. What they underlined, therefore, was a distinction between those
who were perceived as entitled to those resources and those who were not.
The other way in which immigration—or others—was linked to Euroscepticism was that immigration
in and of itself was viewed as a concern for the UK. Typical comments included that “it’s all the foreigners,
there are too many”37; “immigrants get the houses, jobs and we have enough homeless people already to
30A. Travis, “Are EUmigrants really taking British jobs and pushing down wages?” (20May 2016), The Guardian,
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/may/20/reality-check-are-eu-migrants-really-taking-british-jobs [Accessed
8 July 2019].
31Migration Watch UK, “Housing” (Migration Watch 2018), http://migrationwatchuk.org/key-topics/housing
[Accessed 8 July 2019].
32Migration Watch UK, “The Impact of Migration on Education” (Migration Watch 2010), https://www
.migrationwatchuk.org/briefing-paper/204 [Accessed 31 January 2019].
33P. Patel, “Priti Patel: Uncontrolled migration is putting unsustainable pressures on our public services” (18 April
2018), Vote Leave Take Control, http://www.voteleavetakecontrol.org/_priti_patel_the_shortage_of_primary_school
_places_is_yet_another_example_of_how_uncontrolled_migration_is_putting_unsustainable_pressures_on_our
_public_services.html [Accessed 8 July 2019].
34E. Raynolds, “Slovakian family imported dozens of ‘mothers’ to Britain so they could falsely claim £1.2m in
benefits”, (7 November 2011),Daily Mail, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2058522/Benefit-fraud-Slovakian
-family-imported-dozens-mothers-Britain-claim-1-2m.html. N. Gutteridge, “REVEALED: EUmigrants pocketMORE
tax credits cash and child benefits than BRITISH workers” (24 March 2016), Daily Express, https://www.express.co
.uk/news/uk/655145/Brexit-EU-referendum-European-migrants-benefits-tax-credits-British-workers [Both accessed
8 July 2019].
35D. Maddox, “Quit the EU to SAVE our NHS: Top cancer doctor says migrants are bleeding it dry” (9 February
2016),Daily Express, https://www.express.co.uk/news/politics/642236/Expert-warn-EU-membership-damage-cancer
-research-collapse-NHS-health [Accessed 8 July 2019].
36 I. Drury, “Criminal notifications for EU migrants leap by 40% in five years: now there are 700 every week in the
UK but less than 20,000 foreign criminals have been deported” (20 May 2016), Daily Mail, http://www.dailymail.co
.uk/news/article-3450323/Criminal-convictions-EU-migrants-leap-40-five-years-700-guilty-week-UK-20-000-foreign
-criminals-deported.html [Accessed 8 July 2019].
37A. Asthana, “Immigration and the EU referendum: the angry, frustrated voice of the British public” (20 June
2016), The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/jun/20/seven-towns-one-story-referendum-voters
-say-too-many-foreigners [Accessed 8 July 2019].
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look out for — we can’t take any more coming in”; “there’s way too many here”38; and “there are far too
many of them.”39 The former British Prime Minister, David Cameron, was noted as referring to refugees
as a “bunch of migrants”40 or “swarm”,41 while Nigel Farage (the then UKIP leader) suggested that he
would be concerned if “a group of Romanian men”moved next to him.42 The vote leave campaign claimed
that without leaving the EU, immigration would continue to be out of control.43 It claimed that nearly 2
million people came to the UK from the EU in the last 10 years, and the public were asked to “imagine
what it will be like in future decades when new, poorer countries join”.44 The arrival of Syrian (and other)
refugees on the EU’s borders only exacerbated these feelings. It was claimed that too many refugees were
entering the UK as a direct result of the UK’s EUmembership, and typical propaganda was a UKIP poster
showing a queue of refugees with the title “Breaking point” and the slogan “we must break free of the EU
and take back our borders”.45 The UKIP leader was shown pictured on the poster. These sentiments indicate
that it was not only the pressures on resource allocation that concerned some segments of the British
population, but that the fact of immigration itself was seen as unwanted.
That views such as these recounted above were prevalent is supported by surveys and study results on
the attitudes of the UK population during Brexit. In addition to the survey results discussed earlier, for
instance, a study measuring attitudes of prejudice demonstrated the link between prejudice and the Brexit
vote.46 This analysis is supported further by post-Brexit polls. John Curtice, in analysing post-Brexit
surveys, highlighted that 73 per cent of those worried about immigration had voted leave, and that “only
38A. Lazeri, “Southampton locals swamped by 25k influx say ‘too many people’” (12 April 2014), The Sun, https:
//www.thesun.co.uk/archives/news/738664/southampton-locals-swamped-by-25k-influx-say-too-many-people/ [Accessed
8 July 2019].
39K. de Freystas-Tamura, “As More Immigrants Arrive, Some Britons Want to Show them and E.U. the Door” (14
March 2016),New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/15/world/europe/boston-england-immigrants-brexit
.html [Accessed 8 July 2019].
40R. Mason and F. Parraudi, “Cameron’s ‘bunch of migrants’ jibe is callous and dehumanising, say MPs” (27
January 2016) The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jan/27/david-cameron-bunch-of-migrants
-jibe-pmqs-callous-dehumanising [Accessed 8 July 2019].
41BBC, “David Cameron criticised over migrant ‘swarm’ language” (30 July 2015), BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk
/news/uk-politics-33716501 [Accessed 8 July 2019].
42“Nigel Farage attacked over Romanians ‘slur’” (18May 2014),BBCNews, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-27459923
[Accessed 8 July 2019]. See also M. Prynne, “Ukip politician defends comments about sending all immigrants back
home” (8 December 2013), The Telegraph, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/ukip/10503755/Ukip-politician
-defends-comments-about-sending-all-immigrants-back-home.html [Both accessed 8 July 2019].
43 “Why Vote Leave” (2016), Vote Leave Take Control, http://www.voteleavetakecontrol.org/why_vote_leave.html
[Accessed 8 July 2019].
44 “Why Vote Leave” (2016), Vote Leave Take Control, http://www.voteleavetakecontrol.org/why_vote_leave.html
[Accessed 8 July 2019].
45S. Gietel-Basten, “Why Brexit? The Toxic Mix of Immigration and Austerity” (2016) 42 Population and
Development Review 673, 676; H. Stewart and R. Mason, “Nigel Farage’s anti-migrant poster reported to police” (16
June 2016), The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/16/nigel-farage-defends-ukip-breaking
-point-poster-queue-of-migrants [Accessed 8 July 2019].
46 I. Johnston, “Brexit: Anti-immigrant prejudice major factor in deciding vote, study finds” (22 June 2017), The
Independent, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brexit-racism-immigrant-prejudice-major-factor-leave
-vote-win-study-a7801676.html [Accessed 8 July 2019]. Shortly before the referendum, researchers on this study
recruited 417 people who were planning to vote and asked them a series of questions about their views. A psychological
measure known as a “feeling thermometer” was used to assess how cold or warm they felt towards immigrants.
Support for Brexit correlated more closely with dislike of foreigners than several other factors. Prejudice was found
to have a correlation score with voting Leave of 0.51 (on a 0–1 scale, with 0 meaning no relationship and 1meaning
that the two factors matched exactly). This was a bigger factor than holding politically conservative views (0.43),
having negative contact with immigrants (0.43) and being older (0.15). See R. Meleady, C. Seger and M. Vermue,
“Examining the Role of Positive and Negative Intergroup Contact and Anti-immigrant Prejudice in Brexit” (2017)
56 British Journal of Social Psychology 799.
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items associated with people’s sense of national identity and cultural outlook were significantly associated
with vote choice”.47
The preceding discussion supports the proposition that discrimination can take the form of sentiments
towards others and, for the purposes of this article, can be distinguished from the other primary form of
discrimination seen in the Brexit context—that of individual acts of discrimination.48
While explicit expressions of hatred and violence do fall within, for instance, definitions offered of
racism,49 or ethnic prejudice,50 racism is also talked of in terms of “habits of thought, conscious or
unconscious feelings of aversion”.51 Likewise, ethnic prejudice is something that can simply be felt—it
need not show itself as an express act.52 This form of discrimination has also been described as “macro-level
racism”, which is ‘“institutional and cultural” in form, “diffuse, anonymous and intangible”’, and operating
at a “societal level rather than at an individual level”.53 It is this second form of prejudice that is termed
sentiments of discrimination in this article as a way of bringing to light the underlying feelings and ideas
within society, many of which do not manifest in visible acts prohibited by legal instruments.
That such sentiments exist in the UK in relation to Brexit is not, however, a novel finding for the UK.
These sentiments can be seen as an expression of underlying intolerance of immigrants and those others
seen as outsiders in Britain in other contexts, as well as over a longer historical period.54 Laleh Khalili
comments that there has been,
“a long-festering xenophobia at the heart of British society. Britain’s insularity has been punctured
throughout its history inmoments where the need for migrant labour has triumphed the Little Englander
aversion toward foreigners.”55
The UK Government’s “Race Disparity Audit” of October 2017 showed that inequality is entrenched in
Britain across the public sector (even where individual acts of discrimination cannot be pinpointed), with
Asian anblack persons and households in comparatively significant disadvantaged positions to their white
counterparts.56 The Islamic veiling controversy in the UK is another significant example, with the debate
47National Centre for Social Research, “Vote to Leave the EU, Litmus Test or Lightning Rod?” (2017) 34 British
Social Attitudes 1, 2. See also H. Cowie, “Does Diversity in Society Inevitably Lead to a Rise in Xenophobia among
Children and Young People?” (2017) 9 International Journal of Emotional Education 90.
48Rodríguez Maeso, “‘Europe’ and the Narrative of the ‘True Racist’” (2018) 8 Onati Socio-Legal Series 845, esp.
858–859.
49Farhad Dalal, Race, Colour and the Process of Racialization: New Perspectives from Group Analysis,
Psychoanalysis and Sociology (Abingdon: Routledge, 2002) cited in T. Jefferson, “What is Racism?Othering, Prejudice
and Hate-motivated Violence” (2015) 4 International Journal of Crime, Justice and Social Democracy 120, 120.
50G. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice, 25th anniversary edn (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979) cited in
Jefferson, “What is Racism?” (2015) 4 International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy 120, 120–121.
51Dalal, Race, Colour and the Process of Racialization (2002), pp.120–121.
52Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (1979), pp.120–122.
53D.Mellor, “Contemporary Racism in Australia: The Experiences of Aborigines” (2003) 29 Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin 474, 481, cited in F. Allison, “A Limited Right to Equality: Evaluating the Effectiveness of Racial
Discrimination Law for Indigenous Australians through an Access to Justice Lens” (2014) 17 Australian Indigenous
Law Review 1, 7.
54For in-depth discussions see: P. Panayi, Immigration, Ethnicity, and Racism in Britain 1815–1945 (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 1994); P. Panayi, An immigration History of Britain: Multicultural Racism since 1800’
(New York: Longman, 2010); T. Modood,Multicultural Politics: Racism, Ethnicity, and Muslims in Britain’
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 2005); P. Braham, A. Rattansi and R. Skellington eds), Racism and
Antiracism: Inequalities, Opportunities and Policies (London: Open University Press, 1993).
55L. Khalili, “After Brexit: Reckoning with Britain’s Racism and Xenophobia” (2017) 5 International English
Language Quarterly 253, 253.
56Cabinet Office, “Race Disparity Audit Summary Findings from the Ethnicity Facts and Figures Website” (2018),
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/686071/Revised
_RDA_report_March_2018.pdf [Accessed 8 July 2019].
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being “reduced in the British Media to a threatening set of symbols of difference and otherness”, or “a
symbol of barbarism and subservience”.57
Given the depth and longevity of the various ways in which ethnic groups have been disadvantaged in
the UK, Kehinde Andrews describes the UK as having “endemic systematic racism”.58 He argues that
racism is coded into the DNA of the nation. In the Brexit context, such sentiments found a voice in the
Brexit discourse and narrative.59 By pressing a “politicization of Englishness”, the Brexit leave campaign
drew on sentiments and attitudes of discrimination to win its case,60 building on “long-standing racialized
structures of feeling about immigration and national belonging”.61 The result of such underlying sentiments
of discrimination—here, the decision to leave the EU—indicates the significance of (not) addressing this
form of discrimination.62
The contribution of EU law to addressing underlying sentiments of discrimination
The analysis so far has recounted the anti-immigrant atmosphere surrounding the UK’s 2016 Brexit vote.
This is in stark opposition to the EU’s ambitions for an inclusive, united Europe.63 In fact, when considering
the example of Brexit, it can be argued that it appears that this EU legal framework for an inclusive society
did not produce correlative results: it did not prevent exclusionary and discriminatory sentiments towards
those seen as outsiders. This section suggests that the EU’s ambitions for an inclusive Europe have not
been adequately translated into the tools necessary to address underlying sentiments of discrimination in
society.
The main tool developed by the EU for addressing discrimination has been its legal framework on
anti-discrimination. This tool has two dominant features: first, it targets individual acts of discrimination
and, secondly, it offers remedies which target acts on an individual basis. These in turn form the basis of
the two main criticisms of the EU’s anti-discrimination model, of relevance to this article.64
The type of (discriminatory) act targeted is individualistic
Both the Race Directive (addressing race and ethnic discrimination) and the EU Employment Directive
(addressing religious discrimination), prohibit acts of discrimination, predominantly on an individual
basis. They cover acts which are committed by individuals, or which are manifested in identifiable
57M.Williamson and G. Khiabany, “UK: the Veil and the Politics of Racism” (2010) 52 Institute of Race Relations
85, 85, 87.
58K. Andrews, “Racism is still alive and well, 50 years after the UK’s Race Relations Act” (8 December 2015),
The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/dec/08/50-anniversary-race-relations-act-uk
-prejudice-racism [Accessed 8 July 2019].
59S. Virdee and B. McGeever, “Racism, Crisis, Brexit” (2017) 41 Ethnic and Racial Studies 1802.
60Virdee and McGeever, “Racism, Crisis, Brexit” (2017) 41 Ethnic and Racial Studies 1802.
61Virdee and McGeever, “Racism, Crisis, Brexit” (2017) 41 Ethnic and Racial Studies 1802.
62This argument does not seek to discount other factors for the Brexit vote. It seeks rather more discreetly to indicate
that an underlying societal sentiment of discrimination was one factor of the Brexit vote context.
63Preambular provisions in the TEU and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights speak to the creation of an “ever
closer Union” among the peoples of Europe, which in line with art.2 TEU is the vision for the EU, premised on
foundations of pluralism, non-discrimination and tolerance. The EU’s free movement and citizenship frameworks
seek to drive forward, in no uncertain terms, the EU’s vision for unity in Europe.
64However, cataloguing all of the issues with the EU’s continued focus on law as the primary tool for tackling
discrimination is beyond the scope of this article. For a more comprehensive overview see: A. Ward, “The Impact of
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights on Anti-Discrimination Law: More a Whimper than a Bang” (2018) 20
Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 32; E. Howard, “EUAnti-Discrimination Law: Has the CJEU Stopped
Moving Forward?” (2018) 18 International Journal of Discrimination and the Law 60; P. Quinn, “The Problem of
Stigmatizing Expressions: The Limits of Anti-Discrimination Approaches” (2017) 17 International Journal of
Discrimination and the Law 23.
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“instances”, and which, it can be shown, have affected an identifiable individual. We can take the example
of the Race Directive as illustrative.65Article 2 prohibits various acts relating to discrimination, such as
direct discrimination, indirect discrimination, harassment and instruction to discriminate against persons.
These acts are committed by individuals against other individuals. Under art.2(2)(a), direct discrimination
is defined as where “one person is treated less favourably” than another is, and under art.2(3), harassment
is taken to be discrimination,
“when an unwanted conduct relating to racial or ethnic origin takes place with the purpose or effect
of violating the dignity of a person, or creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or
offensive environment.”
Likewise, an instruction to discriminate under art.2(4) is explained to amount to discrimination. In addition,
under the EU’s FrameworkDecision on combating racism and xenophobia,66Member States are instructed
to prohibit certain forms of racism and xenophobia using criminal law. This includes publicly inciting
violence or hatred against a group or a person, as well as other conduct (art.1) and aiding and abetting
such conduct (art.2). Article 4 requires Member States to take into account racist and xenophobic
motivations—and this can be seen to touch upon beliefs; however, it is linked to an act, namely the conduct
in arts 1 and 2.
The criticism of defining discrimination in terms of individual acts, such as the above, is that it is narrow
and fails to capture the kind of underlying societal sentiments of discrimination seen in the Brexit context.
Others have written at length on the flaws of human rights mechanisms to combat racism. Silvia Rodriguez
Maeso claims that racial anti-discrimination law—of which EU law is a fair representation—has been
“committed to anti-racialism”,67 in that, as Goldberg argues, it “seeks to end racial reference, …[doing]
no more than erasing the evidence of racisms rather than addressing their structures, deeds and effects”.68
This can be seen to be the case across the EU Directives above. A 2012 report of the EU’s Fundamental
Rights Agency acknowledges this point in relation to the Race Directive. It argues that the “Directive was
not seen as suitable because while it could be used to punish individual incidents, it could not redress
discrimination against entire groups”,69 and is therefore deemed as insufficient as it “attempts to regulate
prejudicial attitude by punishing discriminatory behaviour”.70 This criticism can be applied also to EU
policy:
“[T]he integration discourse that is currently prevalent in the policy framework of the European
Union (EU) … renders racism as a possibility, and reduces its significance to overt and intentional
‘racist acts’.”71
While the Race Directive aims to address racism in Europe, there is in fact an absence of an express
prohibition on racism, and this also poses problems for the effectiveness of EU law. Preamble 6 of the
65Council Directive 2000/43 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial
or ethnic origin [2000] OJ L180/22. This analysis, for the large part, extends also to the Framework Directive: Council
Directive 2000/78 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation [2000] OJ
L303/16.
66Council FrameworkDecision 2008/913/JHA on combating certain forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia
by means of criminal law [2008] OJ L328/55.
67Maeso, “‘Europe’ and the Narrative of the ‘True Racist’” (2018) 8 Onati Socio-Legal Series 845, 848.
68D.Goldberg,AreWe All Postracial Yet? (Debating Race) (Cambridge andMalden: Polity Press, 2015), pp.162–163.
69European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, “The Racial Equality Directive: Applications and Challenges”
(Publications Office of the European Union, 2012).
70European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, “The Racial Equality Directive: Applications and Challenges”
(2012).
71S. Rodriguez Maeso and M. Araujo, “The (Im)plausibility of Racism in Europe: Policy Frameworks on
Discrimination and Integration” (2017) 51 Patterns of Prejudice 26, 29.
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Directive makes clear that any reference to race in the Directive is not intended to imply an acceptance
of the existence of separate human races. Aside from that reference, racism itself is not defined. This may
have resulted from the fears during the negotiation of the Race Directive of the potential of EU Member
States appearing to accept theories of separate races.72 However, this does no more than “shape the silence
about race and racism in Europe”73—a silence which presents racism as a deviation from European society,
and reinforces the impression that “racism is nowadays perpetrated by a few lunatic individuals, delusional
neo-Nazis and/or declared anti-Semites”,74 rather than acknowledging its embeddedness within European
society.75 Coomber explains that it is difficult for the law to legislate on a vague concept such as racist
belief, and that this explains why race instruments focus on prohibiting a discriminatory act, instead of
the belief. While there is sympathy for the difficulty, it does mean that discriminatory beliefs remain
un-addressed.
There are elements of EU law which arguably go beyond targeting individual acts of discrimination
only. Under art.2(2)(b), indirect discrimination is “where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or
practice would put persons of a racial or ethnic origin at a particular disadvantage compared with other
persons”. This provides some scope for addressing discrimination beyond an individual act, given that it
can relate to measures which create a situation of discrimination, and this “takes account of the disparate
impact that equal treatment can have on certain groups”.76 As such, it can be deemed to be a form of
substantive equality as it “aims to compensate for the social disadvantages suffered by certain groups”.77
However, the issue with indirect discrimination under EU law, is that it does nomore than provide equality
of opportunity and therefore only does the bare minimum towards addressing widespread inequalities.78
Indirect discrimination can be justified under art.2(2)(b)(i) if a legitimate aim can be shown and the Court
has, in the case of the headscarf ban cases, given states a wide margin of appreciation. In Achbita,79 an
employer imposed a neutral rule prohibiting the wearing of visible signs of political, philosophical or
religious beliefs. It is well known that a rule which is neutral may nonetheless “involve unequal treatment
and unequal finishing points because it is not concerned with the end result”.80 This is illustrated by the
fact that the rule applied by the employer in Achbita indirectly discriminated against employees wearing
headscarves or turbans. However, the court permitted the rule to be justified as the neutrality principle
was considered a legitimate aim. For this reason, “neutrality can be an easy cover-up for prejudice”,81 and
this is furthermore supported by the fact that the CJEU, throughout the case of Achbita, failed to make
72A. Tyson, “The Negotiation of the European Community Directive on Racial Discrimination” (2001) 3 European
Journal of Migration and Law 199, 201. States such as Austria and Hungary have removed the word “race” from
domestic law and replaced it with “ethnic affiliation”: H. Garcia, Clash or Complement of Cultures?: Peace and
Productivity in the New Global Reality (US: Hamilton Books, 2017), p.17.
73Rodríguez Maeso, “‘Europe’ and the Narrative of the ‘True Racist’” (2018) 8Onati Socio-Legal Series 845, 845.
74M. Möschel, “Race in Mainland European Legal Analysis: Towards a European Critical Race Theory” (2011)
34 Ethnic and Racial Studies1648, cited in RodríguezMaeso, “‘Europe’ and the Narrative of the ‘True Racist’” (2018)
8 Onati Socio-Legal Series 845, 850.
75Rodríguez Maeso, “‘Europe’ and the Narrative of the ‘True Racist’” (2018) 8Onati Socio-Legal Series 845, 850.
76E. Howard, “The EU Race Directive: Time for a Change?” (2007) 8 International Journal of Discrimination and
the Law 237, 248.
77E. Howard, “The European Year of Equal Opportunities for All — 2007: Is the EUMoving Away from a Formal
Idea of Equality?” (2008) 14 E.L.J. 168, 171.
78As opposed to “equality of outcomes” which would guarantee an outcome or impact.
79Achbita v G4S Secure Solutions NV (C-157/15) [2017] EU:C:2017:203; [2017] 3 C.M.L.R. 21; Bougnaoui v
Micropole SA (C-188/15) [2015] EU:C:2017:204; [2017] 3 C.M.L.R. 22.
80Howard, “The European Year of Equal Opportunities for All — 2007” (2008) 14 E.L.J. 168, 171.
81E. Brems, “European Court of Justice Allows Bans on Religious Dress in the Workplace” (26 March 2017),
IACL, https://blog-iacl-aidc.org/test-3/2018/5/26/analysis-european-court-of-justice-allows-bans-on-religious-dress
-in-the-workplace [Accessed 8 July 2019].
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any reference to “the Europe-wide context of Islamophobia”.82 Approaches such as the one taken in this
case are unable to tackle the deep sentiments of discrimination prevalent in society, as seen across Brexit.
The overall approach of targeting individual acts—as found largely in EU law, and as discussed in this
section—is unlikely to make significant inroads into an environment, as in the UK, which has, for decades,
harboured discriminatory sentiments towards “others” and where the legal structure has prevented that
from being addressed head on. Kehinde Andrews has expressed the view that, although, in the UK,
“there’s been some progress since 1965 … focusing on individual prejudice has avoided tackling
endemic systematic racism, leaving significant inequalities.”83 He goes on to state that “if we are
serious about addressing systematic racism then we need to stop focusing on the prejudice of
individuals.”84
The type of action/remedy mandated is individualistic
As well as the predominant target of European law being individual acts of discrimination, the actions
and remedies that are designed to tackle the prohibited acts are also of an “individualistic” nature.
The primary mechanism for seeking a remedy in the Race Directive is litigation. In other words, an
individual who has faced discrimination is given the option to resolve the matter before a court of law.85
Such a complaints basedmodel for addressing societal challenges—including issues of discrimination—can
be criticised. First, they are limited in the issues they can address86: “courts generally decide only the legal
questions that parties bring to them.”87 Secondly, they require widespread deeply rooted issues to be
reduced to individual acts. Thus, “rights litigation undermines collective action by atomizing collective
grievances into individual problems and narrow grievances to only legally actionable claims”.88 This is
problematic, because individuals or groups might not directly commit racist crimes, but “encourage them
within public opinions by discriminatory ideologies which are infiltrating larger and larger segments of
the population”.89
Litigation and the need to report discrimination means that there is a need to source evidence of
discrimination before action can be taken. This has elsewhere been labelled “evidence-based
policy-making”.90 However, evidence of direct discrimination is usually difficult to come by, and there
82E. Brems, “European Court of Justice Allows Bans on Religious Dress in the Workplace” (26 March 2017),
IACL.
83K. Andrews, above fn.59.
84K. Andrews, above fn.59.
85Or through administrative or conciliation procedures where appropriate: art.7, and through organisations and the
national equality bodies having the competence to assist individuals: arts 7(2) and 13.
86See generally S. Lahuerta and A. Zbyszewska, “Taking Stock of 20 Years of EU Equality Law and Policymaking
and Looking Ahead” (2018) 18 International Journal of Discrimination and the Law 55; M. Bell, “Adapting Work
to the Worker: The Evolving EU Legal Framework on Accommodating Worker Diversity” (2018) 18 International
Journal of Discrimination and the Law 124.
87C. Albiston and G. Leachman, “Law as an Instrument of Social Change” (2015) 13 International Encyclopedia
of Social and Behavioral Science 542, 545.
88Albiston and Leachman, “Law as an Instrument of Social Change” (2015) 13 International Encyclopedia of Social
and Behavioral Science 542, 545.
89EUMC, Looking Reality in the Face: The Situation regarding Racism and Xenophobia in the European Community:
Annual Report 1998, Part II (Vienna: EUMC 1999), https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/ fra_uploads/1944-AR
_1998_part2-en.pdf> [Accessed 31 January 2019], referenced in RodriguezMaeso and Araujo, “The (Im)plausibility
of Racism in Europe: Policy Frameworks on Discrimination and Integration” (2017) 51 Patterns of Prejudice 26, 27.
90Rodriguez Maeso and Araujo, “The (Im)plausibility of Racism in Europe: Policy Frameworks on Discrimination
and Integration” (2017) 51 Patterns of Prejudice 26, 35; S. Rodriguez Maeso and M. Araujo, “The Politics of
(Anti-)racism: Academic Research and Policy Discourse in Europe” in W.D. Hund and A. Lentin (eds), Racism and
Sociology: Racism Analysis Yearbook 5 (Berlin/London/Wien: Lit-Verlag, 2014), pp.213–217.
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are low reporting figures and litigation is a difficult avenue to pursue, because of its time-consuming and
costly nature,91 or because, as demonstrated by the case of Firma Feryn,92 individuals will not always be
able to bring litigation action. In this case, given the abstract nature of the discrimination (a declaration
by an employer that it will not recruit employees of a certain ethnic or racial origin), the case could not
be brought by an individual (as no individual complainant could be identified) and was instead brought
by a body for equal opportunities. Thus, the EU should require that legal standing be extended to national
equality bodies and other organisations.93 Finally, the remedies courts suggest are also limited as judicial
sanctions cannot usually suggest radical societal reforms, beyond the confines of the case presented. As
such:
“Rights litigation can even be counterproductive because it legitimates a legal system that masks
inequality by seeming to provide a remedy while producing little substantive change.”94
This point is also tied to the fact that a third concern with litigation is that sanctions (usually financial
compensation) are remedial, not preventative. Thus, a state may be required to apply law in a different
manner in future scenarios, or, provide compensation to affected individuals. With respect to the EU Race
Directive, sanctions are further still to be decided by the Member States (and are not suggested by the
EU).95
It is not only litigation that suffers from the inadequacy of offering only remedial (and not preventative)
sanctions. Thus, in terms of the Framework Decision, Member States are instructed to ensure that conduct
is punishable by effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties (art.3) and in the case of those
committing acts under art.1 (i.e. not aiding and abetting) that that punishment is imprisonment of between
one and three years (art.3). It may also include other measures such as removal of public benefits or aid,
disqualification from commercial activities, placing under judicial supervision, or a judicial winding up
order (art.6). All such measures are remedial, and not preventative.
Effectiveness
As analysed above, the relevant EU laws have been of limited value in addressing societal discrimination.
They focus on individual behavioural change (by targeting individual instances of discrimination) but are
not effective in producing changes in societal attitudes and sentiments. As acknowledged by the UKHome
Office in 2016, it is crucial to note that “more effective action is required to challenge attitudes and
beliefs”.96
91European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, “The Racial Equality Directive: application and challenge”
(2011).
92Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor racismebestrijding v Firma Feryn NV (C-54/07) EU:C:2008:397;
[2008] 3 C.M.L.R. 22.
93M. Bell, “ENAR, Extending EU Anti-Discrimination Law: Report of an ENAR Ad Hoc Expert Group on
Anti-Discrimination Law” (European Network Against Racism, 2008).
94Albiston and Leachman, “Law as an Instrument of Social Change” (2015) 13 International Encyclopedia of Social
and Behavioral Science 542, 545.
95Council Directive 2000/43 Implementing the Principles of Equal Treatment Between Persons Irrespective of
Racial or Ethnic Origin [2000] OJ A15.
96Home Office, “Action Against Hate: The Government’s plan for tackling hate crime” (July 2016), Home Office,
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/553619/action
-against-hate-easy-read-160916.pdf [Accessed 8 July 2019].
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Does effectiveness of tools to address discrimination mean an impact on social
sentiments?
Effectiveness requires that law achieves its specific goal through the quality of its legislative drafting (e.g.
banning discrimination in the workplace), but additionally that this achieves the law’s overall desire
(reducing discrimination in society). This is encapsulated most instructively by Mousmouti:
“[E]ffectiveness… has two dimensions:… the extent to which legislation is conducive to the desired
regulatory effects (can a law achieve the desired result?) … [and]… the extent to which the attitudes
and behaviours of target populations correspond to those prescribed by the legislation (has a law
achieved the desired results?).”97
Thus, in relation to this latter point, Mousmouti includes changes in attitudes. Such a result goes beyond
the measurement of the acts prohibited by the legislation and looks to its underlying goals.
In this sense, law is defined broadly: it is not just the legislation, but also the means and institutions of
its implementation,98 and beyond the institutions, it also includes customary practices, recognising that
law is an agent of social change because law influences culture (but at the same time culture
determines/mediates law’s social impact).99 Therefore, behaving in a certain way “even when no legally
enforceable formal right exists” is an important test for the effectiveness and impact of law,100 and, as “a
law cannot compel action” and is instead an instrument of “persuasion”, 101 society conforms to law because
it is persuaded to conform, and so law must have persuasive qualities. To put it differently, these points
pertain to the question of whether law achieves its intentions or underlying objectives, rather than whether
it narrowly achieves the legal obligations within it. As a result, social impact should be understood broadly:
it concerns not only positive litigation outcomes (or material benefits),102 but also a broader shift in social
sentiments. To be clear then, the effectiveness of law should be measured with reference to its impact on
societal sentiments as much as it is with reference to the number of individual acts of discrimination
recorded (and addressed).
Effectiveness of EU tools for addressing sentiments of discrimination
Can law be made to better achieve its underlying goals, as described above? One method would be to
improve the quality of legal mechanisms themselves. Suggestions include, for example, improving provision
for, and the effectiveness of, collective/representative action litigation, and ensuring that structural
discrimination is addressed.103 There should be strengthened provision for positive action measures,
measures which target indirect discrimination, a greater reliance on statistics and, of course, litigation
should not be the dominant focal point of a non-discrimination model. There should be a recognition that
“financial compensation is not always the most appropriate remedy”, and that sometimes an interim order
97M. Mousmouti, “Effectiveness as an Aid to Legislative Drafting” (2014) 2 The Loophole: Journal of the
Commonwealth Association of Legislative Counsel 15.
98Albiston and Leachman, “Law as an Instrument of Social Change” (2015) 13 International Encyclopedia of Social
and Behavioral Science 542, 545–546.
99N. Mezey, “Out of the Ordinary: law, Power, Culture and the Commonplace” (2001) 26 Law and Social Inquiry
145; A. Hunt, Explorations in Law and Society: Toward a Constitutive Theory of Law (London: Routledge 1993).
100Albiston and Leachman, “Law as an Instrument of Social Change” (2015) 13 International Encyclopedia of
Social and Behavioral Science 542, 543.
101A. Allot, “The Effectiveness of Laws” (1981) 15 Valparaiso Law Review 229, 235.
102Albiston and Leachman, “Law as an Instrument of Social Change” (2015) 13 International Encyclopedia of
Social and Behavioral Science 542, 543–544.
103R. Townshend-Smith, “Reform of United KingdomDiscrimination Law: Philosophy, Principle or Pragmatism?”
(2001) 5 International Journal of Discrimination and the Law 39, 52.
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is necessary.104 The EU’s Race Directive does provide for some measures which go beyond the level of
individual acts of discrimination, and thus beyond a purely complaints-based model. These include
promoting social dialogue to ensure equal treatment through, for example, monitoring workplace practices,
collective agreements, codes of conduct, research or exchange of experiences and good practice. This
provision—art.11—aims to ensure that workplaces as a whole tackle anti-discrimination. Further, under
art.12, Member States are to hold dialogues with relevant NGOs and, under art.13, national equality bodies
are to conduct independent surveys on discrimination and publish reports and recommendations. In addition,
Member States are to abolish laws which are contrary to the principle of equal treatment.105 EU law also
provides that collective action can be taken106 and that equality objectives are to be mainstreamed across
EU law.107 While these are encouraging provisions and may help towards creating a fairer environment
for those who are in discriminatory situations, none of these actions directly tackles underlying sentiments
of discrimination. Most can raise awareness of, or address, structural or institutionalised discrimination,108
which are inherent in practices, processes or procedures, but they still do not tackle societal sentiments
directly. This understanding of the limitations of (EU) law as a tool for effectively addressing discriminatory
sentiments raises the question of whether law alone can be sufficient in producing the types of changes
needed at the level of societal sentiments. If, as outlined above, law must have persuasive qualities to
encourage broader shifts in social sentiments, a legitimate question is whether, in the specific case of
influencing reductions in societal sentiments of discrimination, legal mechanisms are best suited to the
task. Indeed, scholarship makes clear that non-legal initiatives may also be needed to support the
achievement of the desired effect, as they can be more specifically dedicated to the task. Sayce has argued
that law alone is not enough. Drawing on the example of the Americans with Disabilities Act, she has
shown that law cannot effectively challenge underlying discriminatory sentiments if it is not accompanied
by discursive strategies to combat social attitudes.109 Indeed, as Smart has argued in the context of feminist
reforms, “it is important to think of non-legal strategies and to discourage the resort to law as if it holds
the key to unlock women’s oppression”.110 This is because law is often both a product of, and capable of
reproducing existing power relations.111 Back in the EU context, Zoe James and David Smith have shown
the inadequacy of EU law as a tool for tackling discrimination against the Roma Community, arguing that
the inclusion strategies employed by EU law are ill equipped to aid Roma inclusion withinMember States.
In arguing this, they place particular emphasis on the inability of the EU to make states prioritise (in a
genuine way) the realisation of EU anti-discrimination measures.112
There are a number of ideas rooted in, for instance, sociology and psychology about effective means
of addressing societal sentiments of discrimination. This article does not attempt to explore the scope of
104Bell, “ENAR, Extending EU Anti-Discrimination Law: Report of an ENAR Ad Hoc Expert Group on
Anti-Discrimination Law” (2008), p.16, http://cms.horus.be/files/99935/MediaArchive/pdf/Extending%20EU%20Anti
-Discrimination%20Law%20final.pdf [Accessed 8 July 2019].
105Council Directive 2000/43 Implementing the Principles of Equal Treatment Between Persons Irrespective of
Racial or Ethnic Origin [2000] OJ 19/07/2000 P, A14.
106Council Directive 2000/43 Implementing the Principles of Equal Treatment Between Persons Irrespective of
Racial or Ethnic Origin [2000] OJ 19/07/2000 P, A7(2).
107Article 10 TFEU. See further: European Commission, “European Commission Compendium of Practices on
Non-discrimination/Equality mainstreaming” (Luxembourg: European Commission, 2011).
108That is discrimination, which inherently results from the (historical) ways in which society or institutions are
organised. See further, L. Farkas, “Collective Actions under European Anti-discrimination Law” (2014) 19 European
Anti-Discrimination Law Review 25.
109Sayce, “Beyond Good Intentions” (2003) 18 Disability and Society 625, 631–633.
110C. Smart, Feminism and The Power of Law (Abingdon: Routledge, 1989), p.5.
111Smart, Feminism and The Power of Law (1989), p.5.
112Z. James and D. Smith, “Roam Inclusion Post Brexit: A Challenge to Existing Rhetoric” (2017) 16 Safer
Communities 186, 189.
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such approaches, but to highlight their possibilities. They might include examples such are the inter-group
contact theory or the education theory. The former113 advances the idea that contact between different
ethnic, race and religious groups reduces negative attitudes and promotes inclusivity. This is a policy-based
and practical measure, and is especially effective where it is based on principles of perspective-taking or
empathy-induction.114 In addition, education initiatives are also argued to help reduce discrimination and
prejudice, because they focus on exposure to information about other groups to challenge the way people
think about them.115 In this category, “cooperative learning and the use of curriculumwhich embeds positive
measures of intergroup contact”116 are promising. Education initiatives “assumes that contact alone is not
sufficient, and that people need to re-educate themselves to move on from old assumptions and to change
attitudes”.117 For instance, tackling the root cause of racism through youth activities, as opposed to enforcing
punishments for racist behaviour,118 or simply presenting information which seems distant and superficial
and therefore of little relevance.119 Alongside this, as MacEwen has recognised the use of positive
discrimination policies over the short term can help to level the social playing-field and assist stigmatised
social groups in feeling included, and can work to undermine discriminatory sentiments.120
There are some aspects of EU efforts towards anti-discriminationwhich are found in non-legal initiatives.
These might be in the form of policy measures or financial support programmes. However, these initiatives
focus largely on integrating minorities into the labour market,121 collating and distributing data and research
on disadvantaged groups,122 financing social integration,123 holding high level working groups124 or
platforms,125 or developing codes of conduct or best practice.126 Whilst there may be one or two examples
113Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (1979) cited in M. McBride, “What works to reduce prejudice and
discrimination?—A review of the evidence” (Edinburgh: Scottish Government, 2015).
114Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (1979), cited inMcBride, “What works to reduce prejudice and discrimination?”
(2015), p.5.
115Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (1979), cited inMcBride, “What works to reduce prejudice and discrimination?”
(2015), p.4.
116Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (1979), cited inMcBride, “What works to reduce prejudice and discrimination?”
(2015), p.5.
117Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (1979), cited in McBride, “What works to reduce prejudice and discrimination”
(2015), p.14.
118 I. Law, “Tackling what Lies beneath the Surface: The Racism Reduction Agenda and Global, EU and UK
Approaches to Tackling Racist Hostility” (2008) 11 Housing, Care and Support 13, esp, at 16.
119McBride, “What works to reduce prejudice and discrimination?” (2015) p.14.
120M. MacEwen, “A New Framework for Tackling Institutional Racism in Scottish Housing Rights” (2002) 5
International Journal of Discrimination and the Law 207, 224.
121The European Employment Strategy or the European Social fund. See for example: European Commission,
“Inclusive Societies: Funding Opportunities in The Area of Building Inclusive Societies”, https://ec.europa.eu/info
/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/combatting-discrimination/racism-and-xenophobia/eu-funding-tackle-racism
-and-xenophobia/inclusive-societies_en [Accessed 8 July 2019].
122The EU’s Agency on Fundamental Rights.
123E.g. the Asylum,Migration and Integration Fund. See European Commission, “Asylum,Migration and Integration
Fund” (2014), https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/financing/fundings/migration-asylum-borders/asylum-migration
-integration-fund_en [Accessed 8 July 2019].
124European Commission, “A EU High Level Group on Combatting Racism, Xenophobia and Other Forms of
Intolerance” (2018), https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/just/item-detail.cfm?&item_id=51025 [Accessed 8 July 2019].
125European Commission, “The European Platform for Roma Inclusion” (2018), https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies
/justice-and-fundamental-rights/combatting-discrimination/roma-and-eu/european-platform-roma-inclusion_en;
European Commission, “The EU Platform of Diversity Charters”, https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and
-fundamental-rights/combatting-discrimination/tackling-discrimination/diversity-management/eu-platform-diversity
-charters_en [Both accessed 8 July 2019].
126E.g. in relation to online hate speech, see European Commission, “The Code of conduct on countering illegal
hate speech online”, https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/combatting-discrimination
/racism-and-xenophobia/countering-illegal-hate-speech-online_en [Accessed 8 July 2019].
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of more effective initiatives,127 the EU has yet to offer a dedicated focus on programmes aimed more
specifically at challenging the sentiments of discrimination that arise in society128: initiatives that theories
such as the inter-group or education theory, or positive action theory, described earlier might advocate.
Such initiatives might be possible under Article 19 TFEU. Although para 1 of Article 19 would require
unanimity in the case of measures designed to harmonise Member State actions in this area, para 2—with
its less burdensome requirement of qualified majority vote—could also be relied upon to provide incentive
measures for the Member States to take better initiatives in this area. There may be questions around
whether it is the place of the EU—in subsidiarity terms—to offer the necessary actions to meet the goals
of reducing sentiments of discrimination in EU Member States. However, there is no doubt that
discriminatory sentiments are a Europe-wide concern129 and have been on the increase for a number of
years, and that these have affected EU goals, primarily (but not limited to) the rights of EU citizens and
EU third country nationals to practice their free movement and resident rights free from racism and racial
discrimination in EU Member States. Brexit is just one example of this. Others include the renewed
discriminatory sentiments against the Romaminority in Italy and France, which peaked in 2006 and 2007,
as well as the rights of refugees to seek asylum in the EU without facing racism or racial discrimination,
as part of the infamous EU migration crisis.
Conclusion
This article has indicated that Brexit has brought to the fore an important distinction in the forms of
discrimination that persist in (British) society. The first is discrimination that results in acts of
discrimination, such as hate crimes, which were not uncommon in the lead-up to and aftermath of the
UK’s referendum vote concerning EU membership. The second is the strong sense of an underlying
sentiment of discrimination that swept British society across the Brexit period, which although less overt,
nevertheless was a real driver behind the Brexit leave vote. The article argued that EU law is focused
primarily on addressing the first form of discrimination and pays scant attention to the latter form. Thus,
there are serious weaknesses in the legal tools adopted by the EU to further its mission for an inclusive
European Union. Indeed, it could be argued that there has been an over-reliance on these legal tools, to
the neglect of the EUmaking a more concerted effort towards developing non-legal initiatives for tackling
discrimination in European societies. What form such non-legal tools might take is open to exploration
and debate, but what is a fundamental point of this article is that reliance on law as a tool for
anti-discrimination is insufficient to address the type of underlying societal sentiments of discrimination
seen across the Brexit context in the UK (and more widely across the rest of Europe).
127For example, the Commission states that some initiatives in Erasmus+ focus on targeting groups and possible
biases: see European Commission, “Combating Anti-Muslim Hatred”, https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and
-fundamental-rights/combatting-discrimination/racism-and-xenophobia/combating-anti-muslim-hatred_en#relatedlinks
[Accessed 8 July 2019].
128 In the Fundamental Rights and Citizenship Programme 2007–2013, “only a handful” of projects addressed the
objective of interfaith and multicultural dialogue.
129See generally: H. Kriesi and T.S. Pappas (eds), European Populism in the Shadow of the Great Recession
(Colchester: ECPR Press, 2015); Z.Y. Gündüz, “The European Union at 50—Xenophobia, Islamophobia and the Rise
of the Radical Right” (2010) 30 Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 35, 35–47. The EU’s external relations, as
epitomised by its Schengen visa lists, has been termed a “global apartheid”: see H. van Houtum, “Human Blacklisting:
The Global Apartheid of the EU’s External Border Regime” (2010) 28 Environment and planning D: Society & space
957; L. Story Johnson, “The Integration of the EuropeanUnion and the Changing Cultural Space of Europe: Xenophobia
and Webs of Significance” (2012) 25 International Journal for the Semiotics of Law 211; D. Witteveen, “The Rise
of Mainstream Nationalism and Xenophobia in Dutch Politics” (2017) 20 Journal of Labor and Society 373.
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